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We show that even under incomplete markets, the equilibrium mani-
fold identiﬁes individual demands everywhere in their domains. For this,
we assume conditions of smoothness, interiority and regularity, but avoid
implausible observational requirements. It is crucial that there be date-
zero consumption. As a by-product, we develop some duality theory under
incomplete markets.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The transfer paradox, ﬁrst pointed out by Leontief (1936), and generalized by
Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994), illustrates the importance of identifying
the fundamentals of an economy from observable data. Under the hypothesis
of general equilibrium, the aggregate demand function cannot be assumed to
be observed: at equilibrium prices aggregate demand is, by deﬁnition, equal
to aggregate endowment. Demand, either individual or aggregate, cannot be
observed for out-of-equilibrium prices. One can observe, however, equilibrium
prices and individual incomes. In this paper we address the problem of identi-
fying individual preferences from the equilibrium manifold when asset markets
are incomplete.
For the case of complete markets, positive results have been obtained by
Balasko [1999], Chiappori et al [2000] and Matzkin [2003]. Balasko’s result
has been criticized for making very strong observational assumptions: that one
can observe equilibrium prices in situations in which endowment is zero for all
individuals but one. Under additional assumptions, Chiappori et al obtain local
identiﬁcation of individual demands using a constructive argument. Matzkin
determines the largest class of fundamentals for which identiﬁcation is possible.
Her argument, however, is not constructive.
1The case of incomplete markets is more cumbersome. Kubler et al [2000]
and [2002] use the implicit function theorem to identify the aggregate demand
function from the equilibrium manifold (hence they obtain a local identiﬁcation
of the aggregate demand function). They proceed to identify individual demands
(locally) from the aggregate demand and ﬁnally, they use Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis [1990] to identify preferences from individual demand functions.
Therefore, they are able to obtain local identiﬁcation of individual preferences
when asset markets are incomplete.
When we have real numeraire assets, we identify individual demands glob-
ally. For general real assets structures, we conjecture that our results hold
(generically on prices and endowments). We extent Balasko’s idea on how to
recover the aggregate demand function from the equilibrium manifold to the
case of incomplete asset markets, hence we avoid using the implicit function
theorem. We then use a slightly diﬀerent argument than Kubler et al. to iden-
tify individual demands from the aggregate demand function and we also avoid
using Balasko’s strong observational assumption pointed out before.
As a by product, we develop some basic duality theory for incomplete mar-
kets.
2T h e I n c o m p l e t e M a r k e t s M o d e l
We consider the canonical, two period, multigood, incomplete markets model
with ﬁnancial assets. There are S+1 states of nature, s =0 ,...,S,1 I individuals,
i =1 ,...,I,a n dL > 2 commodities available in each state, l =1 ,...,L.W e
denote L(S +1 )by n and deﬁne the commodity space as Rn
+.
A ﬁnancial asset is a contract v ∈ RS that promises to deliver at each state
of nature s =1 ,...,S an amount vs ∈ R of the numeraire. Let good 1 be the
numeraire of our economy and let p ∈ Rn
++ denote the vector of spot prices where
ps =( ps,1,..,ps,L) ∈ RL
++ and ps,l denotes the (current value of) price payable
in state s for one unit of good l. Since assets are real, without loss of generality,





++ : p0,1 =1
ª
. We
write any p ∈ S
n−1
++ as p =( p0,p 1), where p1 =( p1,...,pS).




























, and the space of income transfers hV (p1)i,a s
the column span of V (p1):
hV (p1)i =
©
t ∈ RS :
¡
∃z ∈ RJ¢
: t = V (p1)z
ª
1s =0is used to denote date zero.
2Remark 1 In general, as p1 changes, hV (p1)i changes. If p1 >> 0, then the
dimension of hV (p1)i remains unchanged.
Let q ∈ RJ be the price vector at which each one of these assets can be
bought at s =0 .
For (p,q) ∈ Rn





+ : ∃z ∈ RJ,p 0 · (x0 − w0) ≤− qz and p1 ¡ (x1 − w1)=V (p1)z
ª
where for every (ρ1,∆1)=( ( ρ1,...,ρS),(∆1,...,∆S)) ∈ RLS × RLS :










Individual i ∈ I has preferences over consumption that are represented by
utility functions ui : Rn
+ −→ R and endowment denoted by wi ∈ Rn
+.A s s u m e
the following:
Condition 1 For each individual i, ui is continuous, monotone and strongly
quasi-concave.
For each individual i,d e ﬁne the individual demand function (in ﬁnancial
markets) fi : S
n−1





ui(x):x ∈ B(p,q,w;V )
ª
Deﬁne also the aggregate demand function, F : S
n−1







Functions fi and F are well deﬁned since for (p,q,w) ∈ S
n−1
++ × RJ × Rn
+,
B(p,q,w;V ) is nonempty and compact (by remark 7) and each ui is continuous
and strongly quasi-concave.




Deﬁnition 1 A ﬁnancial markets equilibrium for the economy E is (x,z,p,q) ∈
RnI
+ × RJ × S
n−1
++ × RJ such that:
1. For every i, xi = fi(p,q,wi), p0 ·(xi
0 −wi















Remark 2 If V is of full column rank, then
I P
i=1
zi =0is redundant in the
previous deﬁnition.
3Condition 2 Assume V is of full column rank.











Remark 3 What we observe in the real world is MFM
Let P ∈ Rn
++ denote date-zero present value prices (see Magill and Shafer,






++ : P0,1 =1
ª
. Normalizing prices to lie in S
n−1
++ establishes
date-zero ﬁrst commodity as the numeraire.
For P ∈ S
n−1








Ps · (xs − ws) ≤ 0 and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
We say that future consumption x1 ∈ RLS
+ is ﬁnancially feasible, at prices
and endowments (P1,w 1) ∈ RLS
++×RLS
+ , if the second condition in the deﬁnition
of B(P,w;V ) is satisﬁed: there is a portfolio of assets, z ∈ RJ, that delivers the
transfers necessary to ﬁnance x1.
Remark 4 If dimhV (P1)i = S or equivalently dimhV i = S, the second condi-
tion that deﬁnes B(P,w;V ) is nonbinding. This is the case of complete markets.








ui(x):x ∈ B(P,w;V )
ª













is nonempty and compact, and each ui is continuous and strongly quasi-concave.










4Remark 6 Since V has full column rank, in the previous deﬁnition we do not
explicitly consider portafolios.




,z i ∈ RJ and an asset price vector q ∈ RJ
such that ((x,z),(p,q)) is a ﬁnancial market equilibrium with the same asset
structure V and viceversa. In fact, if q ∈ RJ is a no-arbitrage asset price vector
(see Magill and Shafer (1991)) then there exists a π ∈ R
S+1
++ such that π0 =1
and q = π1V (p1). It is easy to prove that B(p,q,w;V )=B(P,w;V ), where
P = π ¡ p.












Henceforth we assume that there is a society of individuals that satisfy our
assumptions and an asset structure V . We study whether from the ﬁnancial
markets equilibrium manifold MFM (and given V ) their unobserved fundamen-
tals (i.e preferences) can be uniquely determined. We do not test the existence
of such society (under the equilibrium hypothesis). In the following section
we show that the equilibrium manifold uniquely determines aggregate demand.
Then, we show that aggregate demand uniquely determines individual demands.
In real life we do not observe equilibrium date zero present value prices
but rather, we observe (ﬁnancial) equilibrium spot prices for commodities and
assets. We now show how to deﬁne M from MFM consistent with our previous
deﬁnition of M.




be an economy and MFM the
associated ﬁnancial markets equilibrium manifold and M the associated equilib-
rium manifold. Deﬁne the set
M = {(P,{wi}i∈I)} ∈ S
n−1
++ ×RnI




Then M = M.
Proof. This follows from remark 7 by setting π =[ 1 ,...,1].




and e E =
¡
{e ui}i∈I ,{wi}i∈I ,V
¢
be two ﬁnancial market economies (with possible diﬀerent agents characteris-
tics but equal endowements and ﬁnancial structure) and let MFM and f MFM be
the associated ﬁnancial markets equilibrium manifolds, respectively. If MFM =
f MFM then M = f M (where M and f M are the associated no-arbitrage equilibrium
manifolds of the two economies respectively).
5Proof. Let fi,F be the individual and aggregate demands associated with
economy E and let e fi, e F be the individual and aggreagte demands associated
with economy e E. We ﬁrst proof M ⊆ f M, the other inclusion is similar. Let
(P,w) ∈ M and deﬁne p = P and q =
S P
s=0
Vs(P1). It is easy to prove that
(p,q,w) ∈ MFM (recall remark 7 with π =[ 1 ,...,1]), therefore (p,q,w) ∈ f MFM
and by deﬁnition, for every i, e fi(p,q,wi) = argmax
©





wi. Now, by remark 7 (take π =[ 1 ,...,1])n o t i c et h a t
e fi(p,q,wi) = argmax
©
e ui(x):x ∈ B(P,wi;V )
ª















hence, (P,w) ∈ f M.
It follows that if one cannot uniquely identify {ui}i∈I from MFM and V,
then one cannot uniquely identify {ui}i∈I from M and V.
We now show how to identify globally individual demands in the no-arbitrage
economy.
3 From the Equilibrium Manifold to the Aggre-
gate Demand Function
Let M be the equilibrium manifold. The next theorem shows that one can
uniquely recover the aggregate demand function.
Theorem 1 For each (P,w) ∈ S
n−1
++ ×RnI














2. For all i, b wi














i=1,...I is any one of the elements of RnI
+ that satisfy the previous two
conditions.




+ satisfying the two conditions:











i=1,...I ;V ) since, for all i, b wi












































Remark 8 This is Balasko [1999] in incomplete markets. As in the complete
markets case, one makes no use of any topological or diﬀerential property of the
manifold M (strictly speaking, set M).
4 From the Aggregate Demand to Individual
Demand
If one is willing to assume that equilibrium prices are observable for situ-
ations in which the incomes of all individuals but one are zero, then it is
straightforward that aggregate demand identiﬁes individual demands: for all
i, fi(P,wi)=F(P,(0,0,...,wi,...,0)). That is, when all agents diﬀerent from
i, have no income, the fact that prices are strictly positive implies no demand
for agents diﬀerent from i, and, therefore, that aggregate demand is agent i’s
individual demand.
Remark 9 By the deﬁnition of aggregate demand and individual demand, for






+ there is at least one
portfolio of assets zi such that fi(P,wi) is ﬁnancially feasible at
¡
P,wi¢
.W h e n
the asset structure V has nonredundant assets only, the portfolio of assets is
unique (identiﬁed).
We now show that under some additional assumptions one can identify an
individual’s demand without pegging everybody else’s income at zero.
Condition 3 For each individual i, in the interior of the commodity space Rn
++,
ui is diﬀerentiably strictly monotone and diﬀerentiably strongly quasiconcave,








7Lemma 1 For every (P,w) ∈ S
n−1
++ × Rn
++, fi(P,w) ∈ Rn
++.
Proof. It suﬃces to notice that w ∈ B (P,w;V ) and that
©
x ∈ Rn





Lemma 2 fi is continuously diﬀerentiable.
Proof. This follows from Duﬃe and Shafer (1985, p. 293).
As an auxiliary result, we ﬁrst show that aggregate demand identiﬁes indi-
vidual demands up to a function of prices only.
















Proof. Let ϕi (p,w)=F (P,(1,1,...,w,...,1)),w h e r ew occupies the ith po-




fj (P,1).F u n c t i o nϕi is identiﬁed.
As in Chiappori et al (2002) and Kubler et al (2002), we impose the following:
Condition 4 (Regularity) For every individual i and every P ∈ S
n−1
++ ,t h e r e
exist w ∈ Rn
+,a n d(s,l),(s0,l 0) ∈ ({0,...,S}×{ 1,...,L})\{(0,1)},s u c ht h a t :





















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
6=0
Under regularity, global identiﬁcation of individual demands is possible:
Theorem 3 Aggregate demand identiﬁes individual demands.
Proof. It suﬃces to prove that the function φ
i of theorem 2 is also identiﬁed.
From propositions 6 and 8 in the appendix, ignoring the arguments, it follows
that for every w ∈ Rn


































































8Taking that (s,l) 6=( 0 ,1) and (s0,l 0) 6=( 0 ,1) and deriving once and twice with
















































































































































































































































Both ∆ and Γ are identiﬁed, as they depend only on ϕi.M o r e o v e r , b y
Regularity, for some w ∈ Rn
+, s,s0 ∈ {1,...,S} and l,l0 ∈ {1,...,L},m a t r i x∆ is




s0,l0. For every other












































2 6=0 . Finally,
φ
i
0,1 can be identiﬁed by Walras’ law.
Remark 10 Since V is of full rank by condition 2, the identiﬁcation of indi-
vidual assets demand is straightforward.
So far we have shown that individual ﬁnancial markets demand functions
are identiﬁed but moreover, we can deﬁne them in terms of the the individual
demands that we have just identiﬁed from the no-arbitrage equilibrium manifold.
Let (p,q,w) ∈ S
n−1
++ × RJ × RnI
+ then fi (p,q,w)=fi(P,w) where P = π ¡ p
and π ∈ R
S+1
++ is any vector such that q = π1V (p1).
Remark 11 Since V is of full rank by condition 2 and we have identiﬁed indi-
vidual ﬁnancial markets demand the identiﬁcation of individual assets demand
(in ﬁnancial markets) follows.
5 Appendix: duality in incomplete markets
Fix an individual i.











For each (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++ × U,l e tD(w1,µ) ⊆ S
n−1










: u(x)=µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
ª
Proposition 3 For each (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++ × U, D(w1,µ) is diﬀeomorphic to
©







: u(x)=µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
ª
which is open.
Proof. Let D denote the latter set. That D(w1,µ) and D are diﬀeomorphic
is straightforward. We now show that D is open. Let P ∈ D.B y d e ﬁnition,
for some x ∈ Rn
++, u(x)=µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i, whereas using the
implicit function theorem, for some ε > 0, Bε (x1) ⊆ RLS
++ and
(∀e x1 ∈ Bε (x1))
¡
∃e x0 ∈ RL
++
¢
: ui (e x0, e x1)=ui(x)
10Given that ∀(s,l) ∈ {1,...,S}×{ 1,...,L},
lim
δ>0




there exists δs,l > 0 such that
|δ| < δs,l =⇒

























The function h is continious, therefore there is a δ > 0 such that for all








¯ ¯ ¯ < δ.
Deﬁne x0




















































1 − x1k < ε.T h i si m p l i e st h a tx0
1 ∈ Bε (x1) and, therefore, that
there exists x0
0 ∈ RL
++ such that ui (x0
0,x 0
1)=ui (x).











PS,1)¡(x1 − w1) ∈
hV i, and, hence, P0 ∈ D.
For each (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++ × U such that D(w1,µ) 6= ∅,d e ﬁne the Hicksian
demand function h(·;w1,µ):D(w1,µ) −→ Rn
++,a s :




Ps · xs : ui(x) ≥ µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
and the expenditure function e(·;w1,µ):D(w1,µ) −→ R as:
e(P;w1,µ)=P · hi (P;w1,µ)
11Remark 12 By the ﬁrst part of condition 3, any solution lies in Rn
++ and is
unique.
Now, deﬁne for each w1 ∈ RLS
++, M (w1) ⊆ S
n−1













Ps · xs 6 m and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
Proposition 4 For each w1 ∈ RLS
++, M (w1) is diﬀeomorphic to
(
(((P0,2,...,P0,L),P 1),m) ∈ R
n−1








Ps · xs 6 m and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)
which is nonempty and open.
Proof. This is straightforward.
For each w1 ∈ RLS
++,d e ﬁne the conditional individual demand function
e f (·,·;w1):M (w1) −→ Rn
++ as





Ps · xs ≤ m and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
)







Following is the standard duality result, extended to the case of incomplete
markets. It contains three parts:
1. Given endowments w,I fx∗ solves the utility maximization problem at
prices and P ∈ S
n−1
++ ,t h e nx∗ solves the expenditure minimization problem
at prices P and minimum utility ui(x∗).
2. Given endowments w1 and utility µ,i fx∗ solves the expenditure mini-
mization problem at prices P ∈ D(w1,µ),t h e nx∗ solves the utility max-
imization problem at prices P and endowments x∗.
3. Given endowments w1 and utility µ,i fx∗ solves the expenditure mini-
mization problem at prices P ∈ D(w1,µ),t h e nx∗ solves the conditional
utility maximization problem at prices P and income ei (P,w,µ).That is
Proposition 5 1. For every w =( w0,w 1) ∈ Rn













122. Given (w1,µ) ∈ RLS





3. Given (w1,µ) ∈ RLS










Proof. Part (1) is straightforward given lemma 1 and condition 3: argue by
contradiction and use strict monotonicity of the utility function.
Given that ui is continuous, for parts (2) and (3) it suﬃces to prove that
ui(hi(P;w1,µ)) = µ. For this, suppose not: ui(hi(P;w1,µ)) >µ .D e ﬁne x =
hi(P;w1,µ) − (ε,0,...,0),w h e r eε ∈ R++.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,x1 = hi
1(P;w1,µ),
from where P1¡(x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i,a n d
S P
s=0
Ps·xs <e (P;w1,µ), whereas since
hi(P;w1,µ) ∈ Rn
++,f o rε small enough x ∈ Rn
+ and, by continuity, ui (x) > µ,
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 6 (Shepard’s Lemma) For every (w1,µ) ∈ RLS
++×U,t h ef u n c -
tion e(·;w1,µ):D(w1,µ) −→ R++ is diﬀerentiable and
∂P(e(P;w1,µ)) = h(P;w1,µ)
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the Duality Theorem (see Mas-
Colell et al, Proposition 3.F.1): let
K = {x ∈ Rn
+ : ui(x) ≥ µ and P1 ¡ (x1 − w1) ∈ hV (P1)i
Then, K is closed and ei (P;w1,µ) is the support function of K.
Proposition 7 For every w1 ∈ RLS
++,t h ef u n c t i o ne f (·,·;w1):M (w1) −→ Rn
++
is diﬀerentiable.
Proof. T h i sc a nb ea r g u e di nt h es a m ew a ya sf a c t5i nD u ﬃe and Shafer
(1985).




+ and µ = ui(fi(P,w)).T h e n ,h(·;w1,µ):D(w1,µ) −→ Rn
++ is dif-












s0,l0 (P,w) − ws0,l0)
13Proof. That h(·;w1,µ) is diﬀerentiable follows from propositions 5 and 7.





∂ e fs,l (P,e(P;w1,µ);w1)
∂Ps0,l0
+








∂ e fs,l (P,e(P;w1,µ);w1)
∂Ps0,l0
+
∂ e fs,l (P,e(P;w1,µ);w1)
∂m
hs0,l0(P;w1,µ)










































∂ e fs,l (P,e(P,w,µ);w1)
∂Ps0,l0
+















∂ e fs,l (P,e(P,w,µ);w1)
∂m
(hs0,l0(P;w1,µ)−ws0,l0)































Substitution gives us the desired result.
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